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CASENOTE; DIETZ V. BOULDIN: TESTING THE LIMITS OF A 
DISTRICT COURT’S LIMITED INHERENT POWER 
 
Erik Anderson 
 
“It is better that the present plaintiff should suffer an inconvenience than 
to head down this murky path.”1 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 The power of our courts to wield certain implied powers “must 
necessarily result to our [c]ourts of justice from the nature of their 
institution.”2 Dietz v. Bouldin3 is the story of how a common Montana 
traffic accident reached the highest court in the land by questioning the 
extent of this necessary power.4 The case specifically raised the question 
of whether a federal district court could recall and re-empanel an already 
excused and discharged jury. In a 6–2 decision, the United States Supreme 
Court chose efficiency over prudence and modernity over convention by 
holding a federal judge does wield such power.5 
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The facts of the case read like the bread and butter of many 
Montana practitioners. Rocky Dietz had the unfortunate luck of driving 
through a Bozeman, Montana intersection at the same moment Hillary 
Bouldin made the unfortunate mistake of running a red light.6 Dietz 
suffered injuries in the crash, of course, and promptly sought a regimen of 
physical therapy and steroid injections.7 Staying on script, Dietz sued 
Bouldin for negligence in Montana district court.8 Bouldin removed the 
case to federal court, where Bouldin admitted fault and stipulated to 
medical expenses in the amount of $10,136.9 The only remaining issue for 
the jury was whether Dietz was entitled to further damages.10 
 The jury threw a wrench in the well-oiled machine when it sent 
out a note during deliberations asking: “Has the $10,136 medical expenses 
been paid; and if so, by whom?”11 The jury apparently did not understand 
it was required to return a verdict at least as large as the stipulated amount. 
                                           
1 Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1888 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
2 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
3 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016). 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 1890 (majority opinion). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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The court, with approval by counsel, responded that the answer the jurors 
sought was not relevant to their verdict.12 The jury ultimately returned a 
verdict in Dietz’s favor, but for $0 in damages.13 Thereafter, the judge 
thanked the jurors and ordered them “discharged,” and “free to go.”14  
Moments later, when the judge realized his mistake, he instructed 
the clerk to corral the jurors back into the courtroom. He summoned 
counsel to his chambers, where he informed them that he had “just stopped 
the jury from leaving the building” after realizing that the verdict was not 
“legally possible in view of stipulated damages.”15 In fact, one juror had 
already left the courtroom to retrieve a hotel receipt.16 Over opposition 
from Deitz’s attorney, the court decided to re-empanel the jury to 
deliberate anew and reach a proper verdict.17 The judge cited concerns 
over the time and money that would be wasted if a new trial was ordered.18 
The jury subsequently returned a verdict for Deitz in the amount of 
$15,000 in damages.19 
On appeal, a unanimous Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that re-
empanelment was proper so long as no jurors were exposed to “outside 
influences.”20 Recognizing a split among circuits, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to “resolve confusion…on whether and 
when a federal district court has the authority to recall a jury after 
discharging it.”21 
 
III.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
 
A.   Scope of Inherent Power 
 
The Court began its analysis by describing the traditional extent 
of a federal district court’s inherent power. Power to hear a motion in 
limine or dismiss for forum non conveniens were two examples given of 
“inherent powers that are governed not by rule or statute but by the control 
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve 
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”22 However, Dietz argued 
the trial court erred by finding that an inherent power existed where one 
did not and could not exist.23 But the Court employed a two-part test to 
determine the power was within the limits inherently vested in a federal 
                                           
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1891. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1892 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).  
23 Petitioner’s Brief at 31, Dietz v. Bouldin, Feb. 29, 2016, No. 15-458. 
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district court.24 First, the Court examined whether the purported power to 
re-empanel was “a reasonable response to the problems and needs 
confronting the court’s fair administration of justice.”25 Second, the Court 
considered whether the power was contrary to any express grant or 
limitation on the district court by rule or statute.26 Both inquiries resulted 
in the Court’s conclusion that a district court does have a limited inherent 
power to recall a jury by rescinding a discharge order.27 In addition, 
analogous cases were relied upon to demonstrate the current reach of 
inherent district court power, including the inherent power to rescind 
orders at any point prior to final judgment in a civil case,28 to revoke a bail 
order,29 to efficiently manage its dockets and courtrooms,30 and to dismiss 
cases for failure to prosecute.31 According to the Court, the common thread 
among these cases is the district courts’ inherent power to further “Rule 
1’s paramount command.”32   
 Although the Court found the inherent power to re-empanel a jury 
existed, it tempered its holding by emphasizing that this power was not 
appropriate for use at every opportunity.33 Other vital interests such as the 
fair administration of justice dictated restraint.34 In this sense, the Court 
was cognizant of the potential for taint when a jury is re-empaneled.35  
 
B.   Determining the Extent of Prejudice 
The Court developed a multifactor test to determine whether “any 
suggestion of prejudice” has occurred.36 First, a court should look to the 
length of the delay between discharge and recall.37 While providing no 
definitive timing requirements, the Court noted that “even a few minutes 
could be too long depending on the case.38 Second, a judge should 
determine whether the jurors spoke with anyone about the case during the 
discharge.39 Here the Court emphasized that access to smartphones and 
mobile devices by jurors was potentially more dangerous than talking with 
                                           
24 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892. 
25 Id. (citing Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823–24 (1996)).  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Marconi Wireless Tele. Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1943). 
29 Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (1961). 
30 Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (finding a district court has inherent power 
to stay proceedings pending resolution of parallel action).  
31 Link, 370 U.S. at 631–32. 
32 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1891. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (rules should be “construed, administered, and 
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.”). 
33 Id. at 1893. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1894. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
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those in the courtroom, stating that “[p]rejudice can come through a 
whisper or a byte.”40 Third, a judge should consider the reaction which 
results from a verdict, as emotional outbursts from people inside the 
courtroom could cause jurors to reconsider their decision.41  
Deitz further argued that the common law demanded a categorical 
bar on re-empaneling a jury, going so far as to cite the ancient English case 
credited with establishing the finality of discharge.42 However, the Court 
swept this argument aside, holding that any common law rule against re-
empanelment was outdated and “unhelpful to understanding modern civil 
trial practice.”43 Many common law practices to prevent prejudice have 
long since been abandoned in the quest for efficiency, such as strict jury 
sequestration,44 or as demonstrated by the move to a harmless-error 
standard.45 Thus, the Court found the necessities of the modern world and 
our devotion to efficiency sufficient consolation for its retreat from 
tradition. 
 
IV.   JUSTICE THOMAS’S DISSENT 
 
 Justice Thomas, while acknowledging Holmes’s famous quip that 
a rule of law should not stand simply because “it was laid down in the time 
of Henry IV,”46 insisted that, in fact, old rules often last through the ages 
“because wisdom underlies them.”47 In his dissent, which was joined by 
Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas suggests that more weight should have 
been given to the potential prejudice liberated jurors may return with to a 
re-empaneled jury.48 Justice Thomas is especially skeptical whether any 
acquired prejudice would even be detectable to the astute trial judge, and 
he raises further concerns about burdening judges with yet another 
ambiguous, multifactor test.49 In his view, not only is the multifactor test 
vague and unworkable, it will only lead to more litigation,50 which will in 
turn lead to new disagreements among the circuits, until finally the 
Supreme Court will “be called on again to sort it out.”51 As a result, Justice 
Thomas thinks the common law bright-line rule requiring a new trial is 
more appropriate.52 Not only would it make up for inefficiencies in excess 
litigation, it could also positively influence district court behavior by 
                                           
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 20, at 25 (citing Loveday’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 573 (1608)). 
43 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1895. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
47 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1898. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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requiring a judge act with greater care and certainty before discharging a 
jury.53 
 
V.   ANALYSIS 
 
 As the dissent points out, the Court’s departure from the common 
law has the potential to create more problems than solutions. Instead of 
settling on a safe, unambiguous, and well-recognized rule, the Court 
determined that prejudice was best calculated through an exhaustive and 
untested formula employed by each trial judge. This result fails to 
acknowledge centuries of common law concerns that have been raised 
over tainted juries and continues the worrisome trend of expanding lower 
courts’ inherent power.  
 
A.   Constitutionality of Inherent Judicial Power 
 
The majority admits that any action by a federal court cannot be 
“contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power 
contained in a rule or statute.”54 Further, the Court correctly states that a 
district judge only has the power to instruct the jury “at any time before 
the jury is discharged.”55 Thus, because the jury was discharged, the only 
option for the court was to use its perceived inherent powers to instruct the 
jury to return and deliberate anew. 
While the dissent rightfully focuses on the potential for 
prejudice,56 a preliminary concern should be whether the continued use of 
these “beneficial” inherent judicial powers is even constitutional. The 
majority correctly states that the Supreme Court has never specifically 
delineated the extent of a federal district court’s inherent power.57 Like 
most judicial concepts in American law, inherent judicial power is the 
result of long-standing English procedure.58 Prior to the early twentieth 
century and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, inherent 
power was the basis for almost all procedural management of cases.59 In 
this sense, the Court rightfully concludes district courts have retained some 
of their inherent power in spite of the Federal Rules.60 However, tension 
arises when a court, as here, seeks to flex “beneficial” inherent powers 
rather than “indispensable” or “necessary” inherent powers.61 Indeed, as 
                                           
53 Id. 
54 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892 (majority opinion). 
55 Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(b) (emphasis added). 
56 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
57 Id. at 1885 (majority opinion). 
58 Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1805, 1806 (1995). 
59 Id.  
60 Deitz, 136 S. Ct. at 1885. See also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–32 (1962). 
61 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 735, 742–43 (2001). 
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Professor Pushaw points out, the Supreme Court has frequently paid lip 
service to the principle that “only the least possible power adequate to the 
end proposed” should be employed, while at the same time acquiescing in 
an ever broader interpretation of lower court inherent powers.62  
In Deitz, the Court’s focus on efficiency blinds it to the short 
constitutional leash which has historically bound inherent judicial power. 
When the Court first analyzed the power of inferior federal courts 
following the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court held that certain implied 
powers naturally exist alongside those enumerated in the Judiciary Act.63 
But these inherent powers exist because they are “necessary to the exercise 
of all other powers vested in the judiciary.”64  
Some on the Court have previously questioned the broad reading 
of these “natural” and “necessary” limits. For instance, in addition to 
joining the dissent in Deitz, Justice Kennedy has previously remarked that 
“[i]nherent powers are the exception, not the rule, and their assertion 
requires special justification in each case.”65 Similarly, inherent powers 
have been described as only those “necessary to permit the courts to 
function.”66 In Deitz, the Court gives short shrift to any semblance of 
justification by quickly concluding that re-empanelment is a “reasonable 
response to a specific problem,”67 and therefore completely appropriate. 
But this reasoning misses the point, as previous decisions have routinely 
emphasized that the powers only exist to allow lower courts the ability to 
“protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their 
traditional responsibilities.”68 In this regard, courts have veered 
substantially off course from this limited conception of inherent power. 
Most notably, courts have gone so far as to use their perceived power to 
compel attorney representation in civil proceedings.69 While not nearly as 
expansive as compelled representation, re-empaneling jurors is simply one 
more link in the growing “limited” powers leash, allowing for broader and 
more far-reaching results, while at the same time emboldening federal 
judges to continue pushing the limits of their “limited” inherent power.   
 
B.   Actual or Perceived Prejudice 
 
While the majority rule gives judges considerable freedom in 
determining the extent of potential prejudice received by a jury, the dissent 
rightfully describes the test as a source of confusion which will inevitably 
                                           
62 Id. at 769. 
63 Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34 (emphasis added). 
64 Id.  
65 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 64 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
66 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 819–20 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
67 Deitz, 136 S. Ct. at 1892 (majority opinion). 
68 Degen, 517 U.S at 823 (citing Chambers, 43–46) (emphasis added). 
69 See, e.g., Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Neb. 1995). 
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lead to more questions than answers.70 For instance, what constitutes “any 
suggestion”71 of prejudice? “Prejudice” is defined by Black’s Law 
Dictionary as “the harm resulting from a fact-trier’s being exposed to 
evidence that is persuasive but inadmissible…or that so arouses the 
emotions that calm and logical reasoning is abandoned.”72 Accordingly, 
any whisper from the gallery regarding the case or access to modern 
devices, as the Court points out,73 could easily satisfy the definition of 
“prejudice.” In this regard, the Court ignored the method historically taken 
by courts to limit its effect. The historic “better safe than sorry” approach 
can be traced back as far as Loveday’s Case in 1608.74 There, following 
an incorrect verdict by the jury, it was held that the court “shall award a 
venire facias de novo, to try the said issue by others.”75 
In addition to brushing aside long standing precedent such as 
Loveday, the Court disregarded the effect that a re-empaneled jury could 
have on the public’s trust in our impartial jury model. As Justice Thomas 
points out, “a litigant who suddenly finds himself on the losing end of a 
materially different verdict [after the jury is re-empaneled] may be left to 
wonder what may have happened in the interval between the jury’s 
discharge and its new verdict.”76 Even if prejudice isn’t a factor in a re-
empaneled jury’s new deliberations, the lingering doubt alone should be 
sufficient to ward against it. “When we allow the desire to reduce court 
congestion to justify the sacrifice of substantial rights,” warned Justice 
Black, “we attempt to promote speed in adjudication, which is desirable, 
at the expense of justice, which is indispensable to any court system 
worthy of its name.”77  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
 While modern case management certainly requires discriminate 
use of time-consuming practices whose purpose has long since been 
forgotten, those practices which are still relevant should be left 
undisturbed. More importantly, practices which potentially infringe on the 
tripartite powers of government, while convenient and efficient, should be 
viewed with a suspicious eye more exacting than that given by the Court 
in Dietz, lest we continue down Justice Thomas’s “murky path.”78 
 
                                           
70 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 1894. 
72 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1370 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014). 
73 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1895 (majority opinion).  
74 Loveday’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 573 (1608). 
75 Id. at 574.  
76 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
77 Link, 370 U.S. at 648–49 (Black, J., dissenting). 
78 Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1897. 
